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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
LOGAN F. CARR, individually, and
LOGAN F. CARR, as Guardian Ad
Litem for JEFF L. CARR, a minor,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
BRADSHAW CHEVROLET COMP ANY, A Utah Corporation, and
COLLINS ROWLEY,
Defendants-Respo-ndents,

Case No.
11774
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries arising out of
the collision between a bicycle and an automobile; the
minor plaintiff was riding the bicycle which collided
with an automobile owned by defendant, Bradshaw Chevrolet Company, and driven by Collins Rowley. Collins
Rowley was not served with process and is not before
the Court at this time. Logan F. Carr brings this action
as Guar<lian Ad Litem for the minor, Jeff L. Carr, to
recover damages for personal injuries.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendant motioned for summary judgment contending that .Jeff L. Carr was contributorily negligent as
a matter of law. The trial court found in fav:o·r of defendant and dismi•ssed the complaint of plaintiffs with
prejudice, upon the merits.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks an affirmance of the trial court's
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent can only agree in part with the statement of facts set forth in the brief of appellant since a
number of the facts recited either go beyond the record
or are not supported thereby. For this reason we deem
it proper to formulate a statement of facts which we
believe to be supported by the record. In developing )
the facts respondent is mindful of the rule that for purposes of this appeal we must view the facts in a light
most fav-orable to the plaintiff, though we may deny the
validity ·of those facts.
On September 5, 1964, at approximately 10 :00
A.M., Jeff L. Carr, an eleven year eight-month old boy,
left his home to ride his hicycle to downtown Cedar
City for the purpose of purchasing school supplies. It
was a clear day. There was no snow, rain, or ice on the
sidewalk. (Deposition of Jeff L. Carr, P. 7.) The bicycle
he had been riding had been a gift from his parents some
six months before (Deposition of Jeff L. Carr, P. 3)
and was considered a ''racing bike'' which possessed a
gear mechanism, narrow tires, and brakes controlled
from the handle bars. (Deposition of Jeff L. Carr, P. 4).
Due to an order given by the Cedar City Chief of
Police during an addres·s at Jeff's school advising bicycle
riders to not ride on Cedar City's Main Street, Jeff
turned onto Cedar City's Main Street sidewalk, three
2

blocks south of the scene of the accident. (Deposition oi
,Jeff L. Carr, P. 6 and 7). He then proceeded at a "fairly"
or "moderately'' fast rate of speed. (Deposition of ,Jeff
L. Carr, P. 12.)
At the time of this accident there existed on Cedar
City's .Main Street a parking lot known as .Sullivan's
parking lot, which 11ot Jeff Carr was aware of (Deposition of Jeff L. Carr, P. 8) as he proceeded along the
sidewalk.
As Jeff rode down the sidewalk, Collins N. Rowley
and Byron Keith Anderson were preparing to leave
Sullivan's parking lot. Collins Rowley was the driver
and after backing the car from its parking place pulled
forward to the parking l>ot entrance in order to enter
the Main Street traffic. (Affidavit of Collins N. Rowley.)
In order for an automobile to enter Main Street, it was
necessary that the automcbile first cross the sidewalk
aml then enter the traffic. (Affidavit of Collins N. Rowley.) There was a house s outh of the lot with a four
foot high wall which, combined with a hedge at the south
of the parking lot, obstructed Mr. Rowley's view to the
left. (Affidavit of Collins N. Rowley, Deposition of
Byron K. Andersion, P. 13.) Because of the obstruction
to his view, Mr. Rowley eased the car out so that he
<·culd see past the bushes and the wall and observed no
one on a bicycle but did see two automobiles coming
north on :..Iain Street. (Affidavit of OoUins N. Rowley.)
He then pulled across the sidewalk, blccking it, and
stopped in order to wait for the traffic to clear. (Depo1
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sition of Byron K. Anderson, P. 9 and 15.) Neither Mr
Rowley nor Mr. Anders on saw anyone coming from
either direction on a bicycle. (Deposition of Byron K.
Anderson, P. 16, 17, Affidavit of Collins N. Rowley.)
The car was stopped across the sidewalk ''a good ten
seconds" to allow the traffic to clear, (Deposition of
Byron K. Anderson, P. 17) and at that pcint Jeff L.
Carr collided with the automobile.
1

Prior to the impact, Jeff had been glancing down
periodically at the sidewalk to avoid rough spots; (Affidavit of Jeff L. Carr) and yet he did not see the car
back out of its parking place, start from the parking
lot toward the sidewalk, begin to cross the sidewalk and
in fact did not see the car until it was stopped in the
center of and across the sidewalk and had been stopped
for some time. (Depo,sition of Jeff L. Carr, P. 9, 10, 11
and 26.) It appears that Jeff L. Carr did not see the car
until moments before he eollided with it. (Deposition of
Jeff L. Carr, P. 9.) His testimony indicated that he had
''glanced down or something'' and when he glanced up
and saw the car he was unable to stop even after applying his brakes and thus collided with the parked car.
(Deposition of Jeff L. Carr, P.10 and 11.)
At the time of the accident, Jeff Carr was a good
student, (Deposition 0.f Jeff L. Carr, P. 24) athletic and
independent. (Depositicn of Jeff L. Carr, P. 22, 22A.)
1

It is clear that the District Court was fully cognizant
of the facts of the case and analyzed those facts in depth
in reaehing its decision.

4
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In the Memorandum Decision it was noted at page
2, paragraph 7 that:
''While the said Jeff L. Carr was not an adult
at the time of this incident and therefore could
not he expected to have the maturity or judgment
of Etn adult, yet, the court believes and finds that
where a straight "A" student almost twelve
years old who had been active in a variety of
athletic activities drove his bicycle down the sidewalk and directly into a four-dcor sedan automobile which was parked across the sidewalk so as
to bfock the same, such bicycle rider is negligent
in failing to keep a proper lookout, in going toio
fast for existing conditions where he knew the
parking place and driveway existed, and in failing
to keep his vehicle under control.''
The court further held at page 2, paragraph 6 of the
.Memorandum Decisi'On that:
''From the record in this case including the
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions
on file, the court finds that there is no genuine
issue as to any materral fact and that the said
.T eff L. Carr wa·s negligent at the time and place
of this incident, which negligence proximately
contributed to his injuries and is thereby prerluded recovery under the complaint filed herein.''

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERAS A MATTER OF LAW THE CAPACITY
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF, AN ELEVEN YEAR EIGHT-MONTH OLD
5

BOY, UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE,
DEFENDANT -\YAS ENTITLED TO A SUMi\TARY
JUDGMENT.
In Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25, 337 P. 2d 410
(1959), the Utah Supreme Court nofod that summary
judgment i s a drastic remedy and respondent is in agreement with that conclusion. It should only be used -when
under the facts viewed in a light most favorable to
plaintiff he could not recover as a matter of law.
1

That decision did not state, however, that such
remedy should be unjustly withheld and that simply
because a plain tiff claims injury he sh culd be allowed
recovery. If defendant ·can illustrate that under the facts
of this ca se plaintiff was negligent, thereby proximately
causing his ovvn injuries and that in regard to those
facts reasonable men could not differ as to their eonclusi•on based on those facts, then defendant is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
1

The Fifth Judicial District Court was so convinced
and thus withheld the determination from jury consideration.
·with regard to the facts of this case, plaintiff
relies heavily on Nelson et ux v. Arrowhead Freigl1t
Lines, 99 Utah 129, 104 P. 2d 225 (1940), for the propothat where a child is under fourteen years of age,
there is a presumption that such child is incapable of
c·ntributory negligence.
In commenting on that (·onclusion in Mann v. Fair-
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/Juurn, 12 Utah 2d 342, 366 P. 2d 603 (1961), this Court
pointed out that such an arbitrary statement wa,s mere
dicta in the A rroichead case ''inasmuch as the plaintiffs
in that case w.ere sixteen and twenty years 'Of age."
12 Utah 2d at 346. The Court further stated in Mann v.
Fairbourn that ''such a rule of law has not been observed by this Court in other cases." Ci ting Harold v.
Smith, 56 Utah 304, 190 P. 932, 933; Kawaguchi v. Bennett, 112 Utah 442, 189 P. 2d 109; Morbey v. Rogers, 122
Utah 540, 252 P. 2d 231, and noted that the dicta of
Arrowhead was corrected by the Court later in that
same case when it said:

"The question as to whether a child's capacity
is such that it may be chargeable with contributory negligence is a question of fact for the jury,
unless so ycung and immature as to require the
court to judicially know that it could not contribute to its own injury or be responsible for it's
acts, or so old and mature that the court must
know that, though an infant, yet it is responsible."
This Court further amplified and supported respondents argument that plaintiff's capacity and negligence should have been decided as a rnatteir of law
when it noted:
''The capacity or incapacity of a ·child is a
factual inquiry and the test to he applied is that
applicable to any other question of fact." (Emphasis supplied) Id. at 346.
By relating the question of a child's negligence t 11
a level parallel to any other faetual determination, the
eourt clearly defined the right of a judge to deliver a
7

summary judgment 1based upon facts about which reasonable men could net differ.
In light 1of the Mann case, supra, appellants' argument that any question involving a child' s contributory
negligence must be submitted to the jury is not supported
by current Utah law, and the Carr v. Bradshaw appeal
presents facts which justify the District Com't 's ruling
of summary judgment.
1

Jeff Carr was riding a bicycle down a public sideHe was glancing periodically at the sidewalk; he
did not see the car leave its stall, start to the street,
begin to cross the sidewalk, or come to a step, even
though he was aware of the location of the lot and knew
what its purpose was. When he finaB.y did look up, he
saw the respondent's automobile stepped in the center
of the sidewalk waiting for traffic to clear. He tried to
apply his brakes, but he was too late and collided with
the car.
1

It appeared to the District Court that a boy nearly
twelve yeavs old, a good student, independent and athletic, at the very minimum should watch where be is
gcing while riding a bicycle, particularly one which he
had ridden for only six months and which possessed
narrow tires and handlebar-operated brakes. There was
simply no other conclusion for reasonable men to reach
than that the plaintiff was negligent in not keeping a
proper lookcut, in riding his bicycle too fast for existing
conditi 011s, and riding straight into a parked car. Had
there been a brick wall extending into the sidewalk
1
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instead of the res'Pondent 's automobile, reasonable men
could not have assumed the wall would be at fault in
being in the sidewalk but that a boy nearly twelve years
old has at least some duty to not run into such a wall
by keeping a proper l•ookout. With regard to the duty of
a bicycli·st to maintain tboth a proper lookout and reasonable speed, the cases of Lapenteur v. Eldridge Motors,
55 P. 2d 1064 (Washington, 1936), and Gallenz et al v.
Griffiths, 38 Atlantic 2d 721 (Pennsylvania, 1944), seem
particularly applica·ble. In Lapenteur, the court held that
a bicyclist, who had been following approximately twenty
feet behind an automobile while the driver was testing
his brakes and who in the process of that test stopped
the automo·bile suddenly and without warning to the
bicyclist, wa s contributorily negligent as a matter of law
when he collided with the back of the stopped car. In
reaching that decision the court commented that a motorist foHowing another must govern his speed and keep
back a reasonably safe distance so as to allow himself
reasonable time for an emergency stop and that that
particular rule should also apply to a bicyclist and that
he should be required to keep •such distance from the
automobile ahead of him and maintain such observation
of the automobile that an emergency stop may be safely
made, citing Ritter v. Johnson, 163 Washington 153, 300
Pac. 518. The court concluded its decision of that case
by commenting that the consequences of the case itself
demonstrates "that the appellant was either not maintaining a pro'Per lookout or else that his speed was too
great to provide a fair margin of safety under the cir1
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cumstances." 300 Pac. at 1067. See also McGowan v.
Tayman, 132 S.E. 3Hi (Yirginia, 1926). In Gallenz a
boy of fifteen suffered personal injuries when he was
unable to stop the bicycle he was riding in time to avoid
colliding with defendant's parked automobile. In affirming a judgment for the defendant on the grounds that
defendant's negligence, if any, was not a proximate
cause of the accident and that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, the court noted:
''A bicycle rider has the same duty a s any
ether vehicle operator-to keep it under such control that he can stop or turn it to avoid collisions.
Mehler v. Doyle, 271 Pennsylvania 492, 115 Atlantic 797. He cannot willfully run into a standing
vehicle and recover damages from his resulting
injury. Simrell v. Eschenback, 303 Pennsylvania
156, 154 Atlantic 369. And a boy 0.f fifteen years
of ·age is deemed to be sufficiently capable of
appreciating the dangers incident to bicycle
riding to ccnvict him in a proper case of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Geiger v.
Garrett, 270 Pennsylvania 192, 113 Atlantic 195;
Miller v. City of Erie, 340 Pennsylvania 177, 16
Atlantic 2d 37."
1

1

See also LeFleur v. Hernandez, 191 Pac. 2d 95, 84
Cal. App. 2d 569, in which the court imposed a duty upon
a ten-year-old bicyclist to exercise o·rdinary care at all
times to avoid placing himself or others in danger and
to avoid a collision; and Johnson v. Northern Pacific
Railway Conipany, 66 Washington 2d 614, 404 Pac. 2d
444 (1965), where it was held that a minor on a bicycle
is subject to the same rules of the road as a driver of a
motor vehicle.
10

In accord with the above reasoning is Rivas v. Paci! ic Finance Company, 16 Utah 2d 183, 397 P. 2d 990
(1964). The court there held that even a boy just under
six years of age who sued for injuries suffered when
defendant's car ran into him on his sleigh could be guilty
of contributory negligence. In reaching that conclusion,
the court stated:

"We are in accord with the idea that a child
is not expected to have the maturity of judgment
nor the capacity to cope with danger that an adult
would have and consequently is not held to the
adult standard of care. Nevertheless, a child even
of this age has some duty to care for his own
safety, and if he fails to observe it can be guilty of
contributory neglig·ence. The requirement is that
he exercise that degree of care which ordinarily
would be observed by children of the .sa.me age,
intelligence and experience under similar circumstances."
Corollary to the foregoing is the fact that when a
child is known to be in a situation of possible danger, he
bas a duty to observe extra caution for his own safety.
This is a more particularized application of the usual
standard requirement of due care under the circumstances, the modifying circumstance being the fact that
a child is involved.
In Donohue v. Rolando, 16 Utah 2d 294, 400 P.
2d 12 (1965), the court referred to both Mann v. Fairbourn, supra, Rivas v. Pacific Finance Company, supra,
and to Nelson v. Arro·whead, supra, in re-emphasizing
the rule that a child must exercise that degree of care
11

which ordinarily would be observed by children of the
same age, intelligence and experience under similar
circumstances.
In treating the application of the above standard
an annotation at 77 ALR 2d 921 seems particularly applicable. That annotation noted that under a procedure
involving the above test the question would be regarded
as one of fact: whether the infant plaintiff's conduct
met the standard to 'be expected 'Of children of like age,
development and experience. It is further noted in that
annotation:
''As in other cases involving fact issues, the
court would rule as a matter of law if it determined that reasonable men could not disagree
upon the question .... '' Page 921.
In applying the question of the capacity of a child
for contributory negligence, numerous cases have recognized that there may be a presumption conclusive or
rebuttable that a child of a particular age is capa.:ble of
having exercised s ome care for its own safety. In Gayhart v. Schwabe, 180 Idaho 354, 330 P. 2d 327 (1958),
the court held that a normal boy of thirteen has reached
an age where a degree of responsibility for hi,s oontributory negligence is recognized. In Plauche v. Consolidated
Cos., 235 Louisiana 692, 105 Southern 2d 269 (1958), the
court held that a child's caution in a given case must
be judged by his maturity and capacity to evaluate the
circumstances in each particular case, and he must
exercise only the care expected of his age, intelligence
and experience. Thus, the court held a child of twelve
1
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can clearly he guilty of contributory negligence even
though in that particular case the boy was held free of
such negligence. It was also noted in Gratto v. Palangi,
154 Maryland 308, 147 Atlantic 2d 455 (1958) that a
child of twelve knows he must share the use of the street
with automobiles and as a swimmer must share the use
of a great pond with boats. (For further cases treating
this point see 77 ALR 2d 928 to 940. See also an annotation at 174 ALR 1134 regarding the capacity of nine to
thirteen year olds and an annotation at 174 ALR 1136
for numerous cases where capacity and contributory
negligence of minors has ·been found as a matter of law.)
An analysis of the facts of this case should clearly
reveal the correctness of the District Court's decision
in light of the standard of care applied to twelve year
old boys. The plaintiff did not see the car until he was
too close to avoid collision because he had been riding
with his head down "or something." (Deposition of
Jeff L. Carr, P. 10.) The car had been stopped in the
sidewalk in order to allow safe entry into Main Street
traffic flow a "go·od ten seconds." (Deposition of Byron
K. Anderson, P. 17.) Had the car and the bicycle rider
arrived at the point of impact at the same time, a different questicn would be raised, but such was not the
case. The car was across the sidewalk, the driver had
observed no bicycle riders coming from either direction,
and the car had been stopped a substantial period of
time when the plaintiff drove his bicycle into the car as
negligent as if he had driven into a stone wall.
13

This type of accident is not unique to this jurisdiction. In Jordan v. Crowell, 171 Southern Reporter 4i7
(Louisiana Second Circuit 1937), a case nearly identical
with the Carr case factually, the court held the bicycle
rider guilty of contributory negligence. In that case the
defendant, a nineteen year old boy, was entering a
street from his private driveway, which had a four foot
high wall and some shrubbery much 'higher which totally
obscured his vision, both to the left and the right. He
had to cross a side\valk before reaching the street, which
he knew was not only used by pedestrians but also by
children in the neighborhood in riding their bicycles. He
failed to honk his horn or give any warning whatsoever
and pulled across the sidewalk and stopped. At that
same time, an eleven year old girl was riding her bicycle
on the sidewalk at a fairly rapid rate of speed. She was
mature for her age and far above average in intelligence,
and her testimony clearly demonstrated those facts. She
\Vas in the 8th grade, had passed this driveway many
times and knew that cars came •out of the driveway
every day. She was fully aware that a car driver coming
out of this driveway could not see her until he was in the
act of cro'S•sing the sidewalk. vVith this knowledge, the
young girl attempted to cross the driveway on the sidewalk without looking and at a very rapid rate of speed for
a bicycle to travel. At the time of the accident she was
"pumping" in order to gain speed and a witness observed that she had her head down, which resulted in a
lr:wer level of vision. Had she been riding at a normal
speed with her head up, she could have seen the car in
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time to avoid the accident. But the court held that she
\\'US negligent in riding on the sidewalk, in going at an
excessive speed at the point of danger, and in not 1ooking ahead; and her negligence contributed to and was a
proximate cause of the accident and barred her recovery.

In Lareait v. Trader, 403 S.W. 2d 265 (Kentucky,
1966), an action was brought for the death of a thirteen
year old bicyclist struck by defendant '•s car. In reversing a verdict given at trial for the defendants, the court
noted that where there is se6ous doubt •of a minor's
capability of being contributorily negligent, the issue
should be submitted to the jury, but where an infant of
age thirteen years eight months had been intelligent,
had had average judgment generally for one of his age,
had been healthy, athletic and self-sufficient, and had
been riding a bicycle since he was 6ix years old and had
been thoroughly familiar with the highway over which
he was traveling, the infant as a matter of law had sufficient judgment to. be held for any negligence he may
haYe shown although the court found no contributory
negligence in that particular case. Therefore in light of
the above cases and based upon the facts as they are
given in the Carr v. Bradsha,w appeal, even when viewed
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the conclusion
is clear and undisputed; Jeff L. Carr, a boy having the
intelligence, experience, and judgment of children his
(nm age, was negligent, as a matter of law in failing to
keep a proper lookout, in traveling too fast for existing
conditions, and in colliding with a parked automobile
stopped in order to allow traffic to clear prior to entry
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into the traffic flow. On those facts, the District Court
wa.s justified in light of case law from this and other
jurisdictions as well as general common sense in granting a summary judgment.

POINT II
THE TRIAL OOURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING AS A MATTER OF LAW THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF IN THAT THE
PLAINTIFF'S OWN NEGLIGENCE \VAS A PROXIMA'TE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIEIS AND WAS AT
LEAST A CONTRIBUTING CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
In bis second point appellant asserts that even if
an adult standard is applied to the plaintiff, this summary judgment ·still is unjustified due to what is asserted to be a justifia;ble a'Ct on the part of the plaintiff
in diverting bis attention from his lookout.
1

Respondent asserts that the ·standard to he applied
in this case has been thoroughly discussed under P10int I
and that as to the diversion of attention by the plaintiff,
the facts clearly illustrate that the plaintiff was riding
his bicycle with his head down and that he had it down
diverted from his attention to what was ahead long
enough under the facts to
1) fail to see the car leave its parking stall,
2) fail to see the car start toward the Main Street,
3) cross the sidewalk, preparatory to entering
traffic,
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4) stop,
5) sit motionless for ten seconds prior to impact.
Respondent doesn't wish to contend that when a boy
nearly twelve years old is riding a bicycle over an unsmooth sidewalk that he may not divert his attenti·on to
the terrain momentarily, but conversely the court can
see from the facts that the failure in this case to keep a
proper lookout was not momentary. It was long enough
to allow all of the above events to occur and to ultimately
cause plaintiff's injuries.
Plaintiff '•s own case of Hindmarsh v. 0. P. Skaggs
Foodliner, 121 Utah 2d 413, 446 P. 2d 410 (1968), makes
it clear that
'' . . . Where there is a danger plainly to be
seen, and the plaintiff fails to avoid it, it is ordinruled that she wa s negligent either in failing
to look ·Or in failing to heed .... '' 446 P. 2d at 412.
1

Thus, ·on the morning of the accident a bicycle rider
wasn't looking where he was going, be was traveling
''fast,'' was riding a complicated piece of machinery, he
did not keep an adequate or proper lookout, and be ran
into a car which had been sitting across the sidewalk at
rest for a considerable period of time.
Respondent, therefore, submits that the court did
not commit error in granting defendant's motion fior
summary judgment in thi s case in that the conduct of
the child in failing to see and driving his bicycle into
the side of a parked automobile was the sole proximate
cause of his injuries; and the parking of the automobile
1
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on the sidewalk, even though we consider this to be
illegal and therefore negligent, was only a condition
which had to exist for the accident to happen in the same
manner as the wall to which we previously referred to
in an example had to be there in order for the child to
run into it. Further, that although children are not generally held to the same standards as adults in regards to
negligent activities and the question of their caparity
may generally be a jury question, the same test is applicable in light of case law of this jurisdiction and other
persuasive jurisdictions to the question before this court
as is applicable to other qiwstions of fact.

1

It would appear to us that a jury cf fair minded
men could not reasonably find otherwise than that an
elev-en year old boy who drives his bicycle down a sidewalk and directly into a visible object in front of him is
guilty of contributory negligence.

CONCLUSION
In deciding this case and in arguing the points Lr
the facts must be looked at in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. In looking at those facts, as
they exist from the depositions and testimony of those
involved in the accident, only one conclusion arises .
.Jeff L. Carr on a elear day ran into a car through
f1e negligence of no one hut himself and the injuries l1e
re::eived were a proximate result of that negligence and
were at least a contributing factor to his injuries.
Therefore the trial court was correct in its finding
'
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that "·ith regard to the facts of thi,s case, even when

Yiewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, reasQnahle men could not differ as to their conclusions and
defendant was entitled to a summary judgment, as a
matter of law.
Respondent respectfully requests that the determination of the Fifth Judicial District Court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
By Don J. Hans-on
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Def endants-Respond'ents
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